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King: FCC and Media Regulation

AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL TO THE
FCC's PROPOSED AMENDMENT:
BROADCAST MEDIA CONCENTRATION
RULES
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Federal Communications Commission (hereafter the
FCC or the Commission) is authorized by Congress to regulate
broadcasting "in the public interest, convenience or necessity."!
This vague phrase has historically been interpreted by the FCC
and the courts as mandating regulation that will insure that a
diversity of viewpoints flourish on the airwaves, as well as establishing the best possible service to each geographic location. 2
The inherent scarcity of available broadcast channels makes total diversity of viewpoints impossible. s Those licensed to broadcast are placed in an advantageous position over others unable
to gain access to the airwaves. To achieve their definition of diversity, the FCC has enacted numerous regulations aimed at
overcoming this inherent imbalance.· One such set of regulations
1. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 303 et. seq. (1970).
2. See generally, CBS Inc. v. F.C.C., 453 U.S. 367, (1981); Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television
Broadcast Stations, 45 F.C.C. 1476, 1476-1477 (1964), National Broadcasting Co. v. U.S.,
319 U.S. 190, (1943), F.C.C. Report on Chain Broadcasting (1941).
3. Scarcity refers to the finite number of channels allocated on each broadcast band
in each geographic area. It is one principal reason that the broadcast media does not
receive the same absolute first amendment protection as the print media. Because of this
inherent scarcity, government licensing is necessary in order to maintain order on the
airwaves. Without scarcity, there would be no limit on channel availability, and therefore
no cause for regulation.
4. One regulatory focus is content regulation such as the Fairness Doctrine and the
Equal Time Requirements. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1976). The Fairness Doctrine mandates balanced coverage by broadcasters of important public issues through two requirements.
The first requires that broadcasters must devote a reasonable amount of broadcast time
to discussing controversial issues of public importance. The second requires balanced
coverage of these issues. If a broadcaster presents one viewpoint on an issue, it must
afford reasonable opportunities for the presentation of opposing viewpoints. The Equal
Time Requirements grant political candidates for the same public office equal opportunities for broadcast time. Both rules force the licensee to permit others access to its airspace under certain circumstances.
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is the multiple ownership rules. II
Promulgated in 1953, the multiple ownership rules prohibit
any party from being a stockholder, officer or director or otherwise holding any interest in more than seven stations within the
same broadcast serviceS (i.e., seven FM, seven AM, and seven
on-air television stations). The purpose of the multiple ownership rules (or the Seven Station Rule)' is primarily twofold.
First, the FCC wanted to limit economic concentration in the
industry via station ownership.8 These regulations are founded
on antitrust law principles and, as such, are basically economic
in scope. 9 The economic goal is to prevent monopolies from developing which would prevent competition in the industry. The
second purpose of the rule is to "maximize diversification of program and service viewpoints . . ." by diversifying ownership.lo
Diversity is a first amendment concept. The first amendment
protects the rights of both the speaker and the listener in receiving the widest possible variety of ideas. l l In broadcasting, these
two interests often conflict. The S'upreme Court has held that
when. the interest of the public outweighs the interests of the
5. In the Matter of the Amendment of Sections 3.35, 3.240 and 3.636 of the Rules
and Regulations Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broadcast
Stations. Report and Order. 18 F.C.C. 288, 294-295 (1953) [Cited hereafter as the Multiple Ownership Rules].
6. [d. at 295-297.
7. This Rule is also known as the 7/7/7 Rule or the 7/7/7/5 Rule. The number five in
the latter refers to a 1954 amendment to the Seven Station Rule. This amendment kept
the total television station ownership number at seven, but restricted total VHF station
ownership to five. In the Matter of the Amendment of Section 3.636 of the Commission's
Rules and Regulations Relating to Multiple Ownership of Television Broadcast Stations,
43 F.C.C. 2797 (1954).
8. Supra, note 5, at 291-92.
9. Authority for enforcement of antitrust matters generally falls to the FTC and/or
the Justice Department. The Communications Act is silent with respect to regulating
station ownership concentration. Within the strict definition of antitrust law, the FCC
has no authority. United States v. Radio Corporation of America, 358 U.S. 334, 343
(1959). However, the courts have held that the FCC has authority to regulate media
concentration through ownership limitations. See generally, National Broadcasting Co.,
319 U.S. 190 and United States v. Storer Broadcasting Company, 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
While partially based on antitrust principles, the 7/7/7 Rule is not antitrust law, per se.
10. See supra, note 5, at 291-292.
11. Red Lion Broadcasting 453 U.S. at 390; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. I, 20 (1945); Diversity
of available sources has been viewed as crucial to self-government. In the decision later
upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Associated Press Judge Learned Hand wrote
"[r]ight conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues.... "
52 F.Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), Aff'd 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
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broadcasters, the rights of the viewers and listeners are paramount over the rights of the broadcasters.12 This purpose of the
rule is geared toward protecting the public's right to receive a
diversity of viewpoints. Thus, an odd mix of antitrust and first
amendment principles is intertwined within the multiple ownership rules.
In September, 1983, the FCC issued for administrative comment a Notice of Proposed Rule Making (hereafter Notice)
aimed at amending the Seven Station Rule. l3 The three major
reasons cited by the Commission for proposing the amendment
were the arbitrariness of the Seven Station Rule,l4 the changed
circumstances in the broadcasting industry since 1953,1& and the
harm to diversity caused by the Rule despite its intended purpose. lS The Notice did not cite a specific alternative to the Rule,
but indicated a possible interim amendment in the numerical
ceiling to fourteen on-air television stations and thirty-six radio
12. Red Lion Broadcasting, 453 U.S. at 390.
In Red Lion, the Court unequivocally held that the rights of viewers and listeners
are paramount over the rights of broadcasters. The Court, in upholding the Fairness
Doctrine (see, supra, note 4), stated: "It is the purpose of the First Amendment to pre·
serve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather
than to countenance monopolization of that market. . . It is the right of the public to
receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here." 453 U.S. at 390.
Four years later, the Court limited this domination of viewer/listener rights over
broadcasters by acknowledging that broadcasters have significant journalistic discretion
in deciding how to fulfill their public interest obligations. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 111 (1973). While this opinion
did not overturn Red Lion, (and in fact established Red Lion as the major case in this
field of law), the Court appeared to be pushing broadcasters and listeners/viewers into a
more equal balance when determining continuing first amendment rights.
The Court further muddled this area of law in 1981 by ruling that the Equal Time
Requirements (see, supra, note 4), entitle legally qualified candidates for federal elective
office to purchase reasonable amounts of time from broadcast stations on behalf of their
candidacies. Columbia Broadcasting, 412 U.S. at 394. The Court fell back on its reasoning from Red Lion, restating the Red Lion Court's preference of viewer/listener rights
over broadcaster rights. CBS, Inc. v. F.C.C., 453 U.S. at 394. For an overview of these
three decisions, see Polsby, Candidates' Access to the Air: The Uncertain Future of
Broadcaster Discretion, SUP. CT. REV. 223 (1981).
13. In the Matter of Amendment of Sections 73.34, 73,240, and 73.636 of the Commissions's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broadcast
Stations. General Docket No. 83-1009. Notice of Proposed Rule Making, Adopted September 22, 1983; Released: October 20, 1983 49 Fed. Reg. 49438 (Hereafter cited as
NOTICE).
14. NOTICE at 48 Fed. Reg. 49442.
15. [d. at 49442-49445.
16. [d. at 49442-49443, 49445-49446.
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stations (FM and AM combined).17 The Notice also indicated
that the ultimate goal was the complete elimination of all numericallimitations on station ownership. IS According to the Notice, if the Seven Station Rule is eliminated, media concentration would be monitored by both the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ).19 These agencies
would use traditional antitrust law in monitoring undue concentration in the industry.20
This Comment will review the reasoning behind the Notice,
and criticize its potential impact if adopted. The Comment will
then consider other factors that should be considered if the
Seven Station Rule is to be amended and suggest alternative
proposals to those indicated in the Notice. .
II.

PROPOSED AMENDMENT To THE SEVEN STATION RULE

Because there is no specific alternative to the Seven Station
Rule offered for comparison by the Commission, the Notice is
best analyzed by reviewing its reasoning.21
The first argument is based upon changed circumstances in
the broadcast industry since 1953. 22 This argument focuses on
the increased number of on-air broadcast stations2S and the recent advancement of broadcast alternatives to television such as
cable, direct broadcast satellite (DBS), multipoint distribution
service (MDS) and video cassette recorders (VCRs), among
others.24
We believe that the growth in the numbe~ of
over-the-air stations since 1953 constitutes a fundamental change in the nature of the media market-place that of itself calls for a re-examination
of our approach to national ownership limitations.
Such action is consistent with the Commission's
view that its rules and policies should be drawn
17. ld. at 49450-49452.
18. ld. at 49457.
19. ld. at 49446-49447.
20.ld.
21. See supra notes 17 and 18, and accompanying text.
22. NOTICE at 48 Fed. Reg. 49442-49445.
23. ld., at 48 Fed. Reg. 49443.
24. ld. at 48 Fed. Reg. 49443-49444.
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with an eye to the current market environment
"26

The FCC contrasts the "current market environment" to
the 1953 market with the following evidence: The number of onair television stations operating in 1953 was 199. That number
has increased by 466 percent to 1,127 in 1983. 28 The number of
FM stations has climbed 561 percent from 686 to 4,532. 27 The
number of AM stations has increased by ninety-two percent
from 2,458 to 4,720. 28 In addition, cable television has grown
from an estimated 150 systems serving 30,000 subscribers in
1953 to approximately 5,000 systems with twenty-two to thirtytwo million subscribers in mid-1983.2~ Cable now reaches so sixty
percent of all television households, with thirty-five to thirtynine percent subscribing in areas reached. SI The subscription
rate is predicted to rise to forty-five to fifty percent by 1985, and
to sixty percent by 1993, according to the Notice. s2
Other alternatives to on-air broadcasting which define the
current market environment, according to the Notice, are the
ninety-nine MDS systems, serving approximately 565,000 subscribers. ss These MDS numbers are expected to expand significantly "as a result of recent Commission action reallocating certain spectrum for multichannel MDS service."M Nineteen STY
25. [d. at 48 Fed. Reg. 49443.
26. [d.
27. [d.
28. [d.
29. [d.
30. "Reach" is the equivalent of the total available market in a communications
industry. Regarding cable, reach equals the total number of households having an opportunity to subscribe to at least one cable system.
31. NOTICE, at 49443.
32. [d.
33. [d., at Fed. Reg. 49443-49444. "MDS" stands for Multipoint Distribution Service. An MDS system is a fixed station transmitting omnidirectionaIly to numerous fixed
receivers with directive antennae. The information transmitted may consist of private
television, high speed computer data, or other communications capable of radio transmission. The range of the transmission depends upon the power of the transmitter, the
size and characteristics of the receiving antenna, and the existence of a line of sight path
between the transmitter and receiver. The transmission is one-way, although the receiver
may return communication through the simultaneous use of telephone lines. See infra,
note 107.
34. 48 Fed. Reg. 49443-49444.
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stations serve 985,560 subscribers.35 Approximately 150,000 subscribers received service from satellite master antenna television
(SMATV), with an expected growth to 500,000 subscribers by
1984. 36 Low power television and DBS are "expected to provide
most Americans with additional viewing options in the near future. "37 Another suggested option is the video cassette recorders
and video disc players. 3s Armed with this data, the Notice concludes that "the potential for such national ownership concentration as would tend to monopolize or threaten diversity is far
less a matter of concern today than might have been the case in
1953 . . . "39

The second argument offered is the arbitrary nature of the
numerical ceiling. 40 This arbitrariness is evidenced by the failure
of the Seven Station Rule to account for factors such as the signal coverage of the individual station, the size of the population
its programming reaches, or broadcasting frequency.41 For example, an owner of a VHF station in New York City is on equal par
with an UHF owner in Butte, Montana when tabulating station
ownership under the Seven Station Rule!2
Another reason given as support for amending the rule is
that "it may serve both to enhance the power of the three major
(television) networks and to preclude the initiation of new overthe-air networks and programming."43 Although further explanation is omitted from this section of the Notice, later discussion indicates that the inability of some group owners to own a
sufficient number of stations to generate a base for quality program production prevents additional major national networks
from forming. 44 Thus, the Seven Station Rule may actually limit
diversification of program and serviceviewpoints.45 The Notice
suggests that a "relaxation" of the rule may allow group owners,
35. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id., see infra, note 106, and accompanying text.
NOTICE, at 48 Fed. Reg. 49442.
40. Id., at 49442.
41. Id., at 49442-49443.
42. Id., at 52.
43. Id.
44. Id., at 48 Fed. Reg. 49446.
45. Id.
36.
37.
38.
39.
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other than the three major networks, to generate a sufficient
amount of quality programming. This, in turn, may generate a
sufficient base for competition on the same level as the three
major networks. 4e
By maintaining regulations which tend to interfere with development of additional programming, the Commission may inadvertently be
strengthening the significant role of the three major networks in national program distribution.
The Commission has recognized the historic role
of owned-and-operated stations in development of
the network system. It appears somewhat anomalous to prevent potential competitors from realizing the similar advantages which might be obtained through establishment of larger groups, so
long as diversity is not harmed. . . In this regard,
we note that an integrated firm can realize efficiencies that are not obtainable when programmers merely contract· with stations for
distribution. 47

The Notice further notes that the implementation of the
Seven Station Rule was "to promote diversification of ownership
in order to maximize diversification of program and service
viewpoints as well as to prevent any undue economic concentration contrary to the public interest."4S It states that ensuring diversity of ownership in sources of information has traditionally
been viewed as serving first amendment goals. 49 However, such
diversification "must give way, ... if ... 'public interest harms
outweigh the potential gains that would follow' if the diversification-maximizing action were taken."IIO When such diversification
hinders the best conceivable service to the American public, it
must give way to different approaches. The Notice concludes
this argument by stating, "proper review of national ownership
policy involves separate consideration of . . . First Amendment
and economic policy issues . "111
46.Id.
47. [d.
48. [d., citing Multiple Ownership Rules, supra, note 5, at 292-293.
49. NOTICE, at 48 Fed. Reg. 49446-49447.
50. Id., at 48 Fed. Reg. at 49446 quoting FCC v. National Citizens Committee for
Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 804-805 (1978).
51. 48 Fed. Reg. at 49446.
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Economic policy issues are viewed in the Notice as derived
from antitrust policy. Ill! However, "[t]he Commission has historically considered such matters under the public interest standard
without regard to whether an actual antitrust violation is involved."113 If the deterrence of economic concentration is one
purpose of the rule, then this concern is better left to antitrust
law. lI• Since the FTC and the DOJ regularly perform such activities, further review by the FCC on national ownership policy
would be duplicative. 1I1I The Notice suggests deferring national
ownership-related antitrust matters to the DOJ and FTC on
levels ranging from complete control being transferred to partial
control being transferred, with the FCC and other agencies establishing a "formal liaison relationship."IIG Other antitrust
problems, exclusive of ownership, could be delegated to the FTC
and DOJ with an added option in civil matters of injunctive relief via private civil suit under the Clayton Act. 117
As an alternative to deferring to other federal agencies, the
Notice indicates that the Commission "may choose to pursue development of a methodology to assess economic concentration in
the market(s) found relevant to national broadcast ownership."118
The Commission "seeks a method of assessing concentration
that could facilitate uniform treatment of ownership issues in all
FCC-regulated media services."119 An index would be developed
and utilized to determine if any individual transactions might
lead to unacceptable levels of media concentration. GO
The Notice next addresses the first amendment ramifica52.Id.
53.Id.
54.Id.
55. Id., at 48 Fed. Reg. 49447.
56.Id.
57.Id.
58.Id.
59.Id.
60. Id. The Notice suggests using a DOJ index to compare concentration in broadcasting to concentration in other industries. It concludes that the broadcasting market is
relatively unconcentrated in comparison to other industries such as breakfast cereal
foods, refrigerators, and farm machinery. NOTICE, at 49446-47.
Another problem with using traditional market concentration analysis is defining the
nature of the relevant market. NOTICE, at 49439. The Notice suggests the relevant market to be the national broadcast market (NOTICE, at 49445) with the merging of on-air
television, radio, and other broadcast technologies as an inclusive within this market.
NOTICE, at 48 Fed. Reg. at 49448.
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tions of the national ownership policy. It cites the threshold issue regarding the first amendment and broadcasting as the "furthering of political discourse so that debate on public issues may
be 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.' "61 However, the Commission concludes that national ownership rules do not govern
diversity of voices in any local community.62 Thus, the question
must deal with national political discourse, and the role of group
owners as "gatekeepers" governing the flow of that discourse. 63
For the purpose of analyzing diversity of sources for national issue information, the Notice argues for consideration of nonbroadcast sources such as newspaper and magazines. These organs also affect the national information flow, according to the
Notice, and any FCC decision regarding diversification of broadcast ownership should include consideration of other sources of
information. a. "[T]he appropriate concern is with information
availability, not with market share."611
In analyzing the question of diversity, the Notice notes that
regulating national group owners may not solve the problem because even in national issues information is delivered locally.66
While group owners can be viewed as national firms, the Notice
expresses doubt about the "monolithic" control of information
distribution. 67 The Notice concludes that "absent evidence to
the contrary," these outlets for information should be seen as
quasi-independent or totally independent information sources. 68
As such, questions on ownership concentrations restricting diversity should be viewed from the local level.·
The Notice also cites the findings of the FCC's Office of
Plans and Policy (OPP).69 The OPP concludes "that the relevant context for diversity consideration is the local market, be61. NOTICE, at 48 Fed. Reg. 49449, citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976),
and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
62. NOTICE, at 48 Fed. Reg. 49449.
63.1d.
64.1d.
65.1d.
66.1d.
67.1d.
68. Id. The Commission requested '~any evidence that either local or national news
which is locally originated by group owned stations represents the group's 'monolithic
viewpoint.''' Id.
69. J. D. Levy and F. Q. Setzer, Measurement of Concentration in Home Video
Markets, FCC Office of Plans and Policy, (December 23, 1983) (unpublished report).
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cause '[t]he range of choices available to viewers depends on the
number of outlets available at the local level.' Multiple ownership in outlets in separate markets does not limit that range."70
The OPP regards national program delivery as merely a collection of local markets. 71 The OPP report concludes that if local
markets are competitive, there is no need for national or regional ownership rules.72
The next issue cited is whether there is a relationship between diversity of ownership and diversity of viewpoints. Citing
the Commission's prior Notice of Proposed Rule-Making concerning cross-ownership of cable and on-air broadcast systems,73
this Notice states that increasing the number of owners does not
necessarily increase the diversity of program content7• and suggests that loosening the ownership restrictions may Increase
original programming development. 7G
The last consideration under diversity of sources is whether
the three major national networks should be considered under
separate standards,76 and whether radio and television ownership concentration should be considered separately." Request
for comment on separate consideration for the national networks
was based on the networks' programming dominance over
prime-time viewing. 78 The Notice cited potential alternatives as
"maintajning the present seven stations ceiling and creating a
new ceiling based on net weekly circulation or reach of owned
stations."79 Regarding separate consideration of radio and television, the Notice suggested this as a compromise choice, only if
70. [d.
71. [d. at 45.
72. [d., The OPP report contains no definition of a competitive or non-competitive
market. It expressed. some guidelines regarding the number of independent voices
needed for a local market to be deemed competitive.
73. Amendment of Part 76, Subpart J, Section 76.50 of the Commission's Rules and
Regulations Relative to Elimination of the Prohibition on Common Ownership of Cable
Television Systems and National Television Networks, 47 Fed. Reg. 39212 (September 7,
1982).
74. NOTICE, at 48 Fed. Reg. 49450.
75. [d. See supra, notes 43·47, and accompanying text.
76. NOTICE, at 48 Fed. Reg. 49450-49451.
77. [d., at 49451.
78. [d., at 49450.
79. [d.
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the television rules were not amended to the degree suggested.80
III.

CRITIQUE OF THE NOTICE

The first support offered by the Notice for amending the
Seven Station rule is changed circumstances in the broadcast industry since 1953.81 While there is no doubt that three decades
have changed and expanded broadcasting, the weight placed by
the Notice on these changes may be greater than actually
warranted.
The Commission chose 1953 as its statistical year for measuring changes in comparison with the current market.8s While
1953 appears to be a logical point for comparison since it is the
year the Seven Station Rule was issued, it may also be a significantly misleading starting point. This is especially true when analyzing on-air television growth. 8s
A brief review of the burgeoning television industry and accompanying FCC regulation in the years prior to 1953 sheds
light on the state of television growth at the time chosen by the
Notice for comparison to current markets.
Commercial television began in earnest following World
War 11.84 As a prelude to the expected interest in this new industry, the FCC allocated thirteen carrier frequencies on VHF to
commercial television (later reduced to twelve).80 By 1948, these
12 channels were proving to be insufficient. On September 30,
1948, the FCC imposed a freeze on the television licensing procedure in order to consider proper regulatory approaches to this

so. [d., at 49451. The Notice clearly expressed the alternative nature of separate
considerations. It noted the Commission's intent "to reduce our national broadcast ownership restrictions, ... to the maximum extent feasible . . . .n Separate considerations
of radio concentration would only be considered if amendment to the television concentration rules were rejected.
81. NOTICE, at 48 Fed. Reg. 49442-49445.
82. [d.
83. This is not the case with radio. Commercial radio has existed much longer, and
was far more entrenched than television in 1953. Radio did not experience a sudden
increase in the number of licensed stations immediately after the Seven Station Rule was
promulgated. Thus, choosing the year 1953 for comparison is justifiable in radio, whereas
with television, this is not the case. See infra, notes 84-96, and accompanying text.
84. J. GRBENJlIELD, TELEVISION, THE FIRsT FIFTY YEARS, at 43 (1977).
85. [d.
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quickly expanding industry.s8 At the start of the freeze there
were 108 operating stations in the U.S.S7
In July, 1952, the freeze was lifted, and the FCC began issuing licenses on both VHF and the newly adopted UHF frequency.8S By the beginning of 1955, 567 television stations were
authorized by the FCC, with 439 operating on the air. s9 These
statistics are taken a mere three months after the 1954 amendment finalized the Seven Station Rule. 90 The number used for
comparison to the current market in the Notice is 199 on-air stations as of 1953.91 This selection fails to account for the immediate boom of licensing after the freeze was lifted in the period
from 1952-1956. In fact, the cause for freezing the licensing procedure was the inability of the FCC supply to keep up with the
demand for new licenses. 92 The Commission was undoubtedly
cognizant that extensive growth in television licensing was imminent when the Seven Station Rule was promulgated, and this
expected growth was considered when the Commiss'ion selected
its numerical ceiling. By using a deflated number, the argument
of changed circumstances is somewhat weakened. In addition,
the Notice cites the number of on-air television stations as 1,127
as of June 30, 1983.98 However, this number includes non-commercial stations.H As of November 30, 1983,867 commercial television stations were operating, according to the FCC Daily Digest.911 When compared with the 609 commercial stations with
authority to broadcast by 1956, the Notice's claim of changed
circumstances is greatly diluted (a percentage drop from 469%
to approximately thirty percent increase).98
The Notice also neglects to account for other factors when
arguing changed circumstances in the industry. For example, the
86. 13 Fed. Reg. 5860 (1948).
87. DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING, 179 (Kahn ed. 1984).
88. Sixth Report and Order, 41 F.C.C. 148 (1952).
89. Broadcasting/Cablecasting Yearbook 1983, B-384 (1983). By the end of 1956,
there were 609 commercial television stations authorized to broadcast by the FCC. FCC,
22nd Annual Report, at 116 (1956).
90. Supra, note 7.
9l. NOTICE, at 48 Fed. Reg. 49443.
92. Supra, note 86.
93. NOTICE, at 48 Fed. Reg. 49443.
94. Id., at n.57.
95. FCC Daily Digest, December 19, 1983.
96. FCC, 22nd Annual Report, at 116 (1956).
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United States' population rose by approximately fifty percent
from 1953 to the present. 97 Thus, while the percentage of on-air
stations has risen, the number of viewers served has also risen.
Depending on the starting point chosen for comparison, the population increase may actually be greater than the on-air station
increase. This also weakens the Notice's changed circumstances
argument.
The second prong of the Notice's claim for changed circumstances lies in the expansion of what can be termed new technology.98 These new technologies are providing alternative news,
entertainment, and commentary sources to traditional on-air television, according to the Notice.99 The Notice cites the enormous growth of cable television since 1953 as its leading argument. 100 There is no doubt that cable television presently
provides significant alternative sources of programming to a portion of the American public. Arguably, its growth potential is
also positive. However, the Notice fails to discuss cable's inherent limitations.
Cable presently reaches approximately forty percent of the
nation's television households. 101 The Notice cites optimistic
growth figures for the coming years. 102 Yet no matter how large
this forty percent figure looms in comparison to cable's past, the
glaring fact remains that over 150 million Americans are without
cable, so, as a means of communication, cable is nowhere near as
significant in reach as on-air television for the majority of Americans. Also, cable does not have as large an impact on the American viewer as on-air television. loa
97. U.S. population at the end of 1983 was approximately 233 million. U.S. NEWS &
REP., March 5, 1984, at 13, citing United States Census Bureau. U.S. population
in 1953 was approximately 159 million. Historical Statistics of the United States, U.S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, at Al-8.
98. NOTICE, at 48 Fed. Reg. 49-43-49444.
99. [d.
100. [d., at 49443.
101. [d.
102. [d., at n. 61.
103. A 1981 study by the Roper Organization shows that sixty-seven percent of the
U.S. population turns to television as the source of most of its news. A Short Course in
Broadcasting, Broadcasting/Cablecasting Yearbook at A-2 (1981). In February of 1981,
eight-six percent of the households without cable television watched network affiliate
stations. Only fourteen percent watched other on-air stations. During the same time, of
the homes with cable services, sixty-five percent watched network affiliated stations. The
WORLD
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Another problem with using cable in comparison to on-air
television is cable's prohibitive cost. To obtain cable services, an
installment fee and refundable equipment' deposit is generally
required. In addition, a monthly entertainment fee is charged.
The amount of this fee will depend on the level and amount of
entertainment desired. lM For many, cable costs prohibit service.
For others who are able to afford basic cable services, the volume of service received is directly related to spending capability.
The Notice cites numerous new technologies such as MDS,
STV, DBS and video recorders as other new alternatives to onair television. 1011 However, the statistics offered in the Notice reflect the minute impact these new technologies have had on the
current market. With the exception of VCRs,106 all of the new
technologies suggested in the Notice combine for a total of one
million subscribers.l07 Assuming that all of these subscribers are
from different households and that each household contains four
members, the total reach of the new technologies is less than two
percent of the nation's population. The Notice includes these
new technologies as viable alternatives to on-air television
mainly because of potential future growth. l08 However, glowing
prospects for growth may not exist. For example, STV is now
available through nineteen stations. lOB This number is down
from twenty-seven stations in the early 1980's. Subscription
levels are also down. While this may not indicate a dying or
stagnant industry, it also doesn't indicate rosy prospects for immediate impact on diversity of programming sources to the vast
majority of Americans. no
remaining percentage was divided among pay cable and other on-air stations. Neilsen
Television Index Estimates, NEILSEN REPORT ON TELEVlSION at 12 (1981).
104. BALDWIN & McCoy, CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, at 3, 126, 128, 130-33 (1983).
105. NOTICE, at 48 Fed. Reg. 49443-44.
106. VCR's are playback recorders. Their capacity as a source of communication is
limited to regurgitating information, entertainment, etc. derived from other sources.
VCR's do not exist as original sources or communicators ofinformation. As such, including this product as an alternative source which is expanding diversity is improper.
107. NOTICE, at 48 Fed. Reg. 49443-44.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Bloom is Off TV Rose, BROADCASTING, September 5, 1983 at 36. Another alternative programming source suggested in the Notice, MDS, only adds one additional
channel. The FTC has re-allocated spectrum for multi-channel MDS system, but only
one experimental system is operating at this time. Even when fully operational, MDS
only provides four channels, and can exist in very limited circumstances. Eight DBS
licensees are authorized by the Commission, and high powered systems are not expected
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Taking all the evidence offered in the Notice into consideration, there appears to be some level of "changed circumstances"
in the industry since 1953. Most positively, this occurs in cable
television. Those receiving cable have increased their diversity of
available sources extensively. For example, some cable systems
offer viewers more than twenty channels. Some of these systems
include on-air stations from other cities, and all-new stations, as
well as traditional television. format. To the degree that cable
has grown, the FCC's argument of changed circumstances is
supportable.
Another strong argument for changed circumstances is the
growth of the "new technologies." By taking these potential
sources of diverse programming into consideration, the FCC appears to be regulating for future industry. Since any amendment
to the Seven Station Rule will be controlling the future ownership policies of broadcasting, the Commission is looking in the
proper direction for solutions. However, a closer review of these
new technologies l l l shows that the FCC may be looking too far
into the future for proper regulation of today's industry. If these
technologies succeed in the future and provide expanded broadcasting sources, new amendments (and/or abolishment> of media
ownership rules can be considered. Until substantial changes occur, these new technologies should be measured by their present
impact, plus any reasonably conceivable growth over the next
few years. The unstable nature of these new technologies, coupled with their inconsistent growth patterns, make regulation
based on projected growth mere speculation.
The second argument offered in the Notice is the arbitrary
selection of the number "seven" as the ceiling in the media concentration rules. ll2 As discussed above, the FCC undoubtedly realized the arbitrariness of numerical ceilings when the Rule was
promulgated in 1953. However, as the history of the Commission
in the 1950's and early 1960's shows, alternative approaches to
numerical limitations were rejected. 113
for several years. BROADCASTING, February 7, 1983 at 31, 37. No low-powered television
stations are currently in operation and no license will be granted in urban areas for several years. 48 Fed. Reg. 27, 182 (1983).
111. See supra and infra notes 100-19 and accompanying text.
112. NOTICE, at 49442-49443.
113. Following the promulgation of the 7/7/7 Rule in 1953, several congressional
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"The overall choices in approaching the media concentration
rules boil down to two categories: The first is total elimination of
ownership rules, with concentration concerns being guided by
antitrust laws administered by the DOJ and the FTC. The second choice is some standard based on a mathematical formula,
such as a numerical ceiling like the one currently used or a
formula based on a percentage of some measurable aspect of
concentration, like the proposed Bricker Amendment. 114
The FCC has indicated that total elimination of the concentration rules may be the long term goal of any amendment to
the Seven Station Rule.l1II If the FCC removes itself from monitoring concentration, the services of other federal agencies will
be needed to check the broadcasting industry under the antitrust laws.ll6 This prospect presents some positive features. The
media concentration laws are in part based on antitrust principles. Use of the antitrust laws to enforce the principles behind
the media concentration rules appears to be a logical extension
of the Rule. If true concentration exists in any broadcasting industry, or any combination of broadcasting industries, traditional antitrust laws could be applied. This might have the same
effect on economic concentration in broadcasting as it does on
economic concentration in other industries.
Momentarily assuming that use of antitrust laws does not
ignore the diversity principles of the Seven Station Rule, several
problems remain. One problem is drawing the proper guidelines
to determine concentration using the antitrust law. The Notice
suggests development of a methodology to assess economic constudies were taken, aimed at limiting network control over the airwaves. One study, the
"Network Monopoly" Report, or the Bricker Report (after Sen. John Bricker of Ohio)
proposed dropping the 7/7/7 Rule in favor of a coverage limitation. The Bricker rule
would forbid any single entity from owning television stations having coverage of more
than twenty-five percent of the nation's population. (At the time owned and operated
stations of NBC covered 23% of the nation's population, CBS covered 20% and ABC
covered 29%.) This proposal never came to vote in Congress. The FCC also considered
judging media concentration on a case-by case basis. This was also rejected. Several
other investigations were made by both the FCC and Congress into methods of controlling the growing power of the networks. All of these proposals were rejected, and the 7/7/
7 Rule remained. Howard, Multiple Broadcast Ownership: Regulatory History, 27 FED.
COMM. BAR J. I, 21-39 (1974).
114. [d.

115. NOTICE at 48 Fed. Reg. 49451.
116. [d., at 48 Fed. Reg. 49446-47.
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centration in relevant markets.1l7 Markets considered relevant
are geographic and product markets. The Notice cites the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) presently used by the DOJ
as a possible tool to measure economic concentration. 118
There may be some difficulties in switching from antitrust
principles to antitrust law. The principles govern the broad nature of antitrust: preventing concentration. The law is more specific and requires a well-defined market, one in which there is a
direct relationship between a buyer and seller, and a price for
the goods or service involved. In broadcasting, the broadcasteradvertiser relationship falls into a traditional market scenario.
As .such, regulation of these relations under antitrust law appears feasible. However, this broadcaster-advertiser relationship
fails to include impact on the most important party - the
viewer.
The economic impact on the viewer is difficult to discern.
Although the viewer pays no direct fee for the service received,
the general consuming public will eventually bear the cost of an
imbalanced economic relationship between advertiser and
broadcaster. Finding the proper index to measure such a nebu~
lous relationship may prove difficult.ll9 The Notice neglected to
offer a reasonable index to measure the impact on the viewer of
such transactions. Until a proper index is formulated, use of antitrust law may prove to be an inadequate protection for the
viewer.
If such antitrust laws could be implemented to ensure the
diversity principles entwined within the media concentration
rules, a transition of this nature could solve the problem. How117. [d., at 48 Fed. Reg. 49447-48.
118. [d. Using the HHI, the Notice draws a favorable comparison between concentration in broadcasting and other industries such as refrigerators and breakfast cereals.
This comparison is perhaps the best argument as to why antitrust laws are an inadequate measure of concentration in broadcasting. Economic control of the major sources
. of information dissemination in the U.S. could be dangerous to the diversity of information necessary for a functioning democracy. If the concentration levels of broadcasting
are such that program and information alternatives dwindle, the options are not simple
or readily available. The counter argument to this is that indices can be adjusted to
reasonably measure economic concentration in broadcasting. Because of television's
unique situation, more stringent controls could be adopted than are used in other
industries.
119. See, supra, notes 58-60, and accompanying text.
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ever, because antitrust laws are economically oriented, adaptation of these laws to first amendment principles is difficult. In
fact, the focus on exchanging the numerical ceiling for antitrust
law will bring economic concentration to the forefront of what
had previously been a two-pronged regulatory focus. Replacing
the Seven Station Rule with antitrust laws makes economic concentration the sole factor in regulating concentration in the industry. The issue of diversity of information sources, as a first
amendment principle, becomes a secondary factor (if it remains
a factor at all).
Rejecting or emasculating the first amendment impact on
the media concentration rules goes against a half-century of regulatory policy.120 The important issue in any change of broadcast regulatory policy is its impact on the viewers.l21 From a first
amendment standpoint, this means the affect on the viewer's
right to receive all possible information from a diverse marketplace of ideas. 122 Strong statistical support should unequivocally
be established by the Commission to show that the viewers' first
amendment rights are not impaired. This proposed change is
primarily based on the alleged weakening of the scarcity rationale. 128 Given the weak statistical support offered by the Commission in the Notice for the end to scarcity,iU such a radical departure from tradition may constitute blind deregulation under
the guise of progress.
The vast majority of citizens receive much of their information through traditional on-air television sources. 12II Breaking
this down further, most viewers receive information from stations on VHF.126 VHF is thoroughly dominated by the three major networks and their affiliatees.l2'7 Contrary to arguments of120. See generally, National Broadcasting Co. v. U.S., 319 U.S. 190; Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367; CBS, Inc. v. F.C.C., 453 U.S. 367.
121. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. at 390.
122. [d.
123. NOTICE, at 48 Fed. Reg. 49442-45.
124. See supra, notes 81-111 and accompanying text.
125. See supra, note 103.
126. [d. This information shows the dominance of the three networks in viewer audience share. The networks broadcast almost completely on VHF, see infra, notes 127141, and accompanying text.
127. FCC, 45th Annual Report, 100-01 (1979). This cite notes the Television Financial Data. Of the 513 VHF stations listed, fifteen are network owned, 469 are network
affiliated, and twenty-nine are independent.
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fered in the Notice, statistics show that the three major
networks control a large portion of the on-air television programming, including news coverage. 12B While other sources are
available, they pale in comparison to VHF television in terms of
viewer impact. If it were merely a matter of consumer preference
for one set of equal competitors over another, the effect might
be irrelevant. However, years of marketplace competition, partially nurtured by FCC regulation,129 have placed the VHF medium and the three major networks above all other electronic
media. To argue that scarcity has ended without analyzing the
most dominant medium in the United States is negligent regulatory planning. Changes. in the media concentration rules will
have significant impact on viewer first amendment rights, and
should not be blithely dismissed without further consideration.
Because of the importance of first amendment considerations,
antitrust law will likely prove an inadequate alternative.
If antitrust laws are inadequate standards, other non-arbitrary alternatives should be examined. The Notice indicates an
interim step of fourteen television stations, and thirty-six radio
stations is being considered. 130 These expanded numbers permit
greater latitude in ownership, but absent any logical support for
these new numbers, this solution seems as arbitrary as the Seven
Station Rule. 131 Arguing that the Seven Station Rule is arbitrary, and replacing it with new and equally arbitrary numbers
may not be sufficiently logical to support such a major change.

Another alternative is limiting ownership to a percentage of
the total market. This was considered and rejected in the 1950's
mainly because of administrative difficulties. 132 A percentage
128. New Television Networks: Entry, Jurisdiction, Ownership and Regulation, Volume I. Final Report: Network Inquiry Special Staff, F.C.C., October, 1980, at 228-30
(hereafter cited as NETWORK INQUlRY).
129. See supra, note 120.
130. NOTICE, at 48 Fed. Reg. 49450-52.
131. This is probably not the case in radio. The numbers for comparison in arguing
changes in circumstances in radio do not suffer from the same deficiencies as those used
by the Commission when comparing television. Radio has a larger number of stations
available for commercial ownership than does television, making scarcity a smaller problem. Also, regional radio networks do not suffer the same competitive disadvantages as
regional television networks when competing against national networks. Therefore, arbitrary numbers such as those suggested may not have the same stifling effect on radio as
they would on television.
132. See supra, note 113.
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reach alternative such as this would also be inherently arbitrary.
As such, it assumedly would be rejected under the reasoning
contained in the Notice.
The third reason offered in the Notice for amending the
Seven Station Rule is that the Rule may actually limit diversity.lsS The reasoning offered is that the inability of group owners to own a sufficient number of stations "to generate a base for
quality program production"184 prevents additional major national networks from forming. 18& The conceptual idea of this reasoning can be broken down into an equation. To achieve diversity, national networks are necessary and for national networks
to exist, ownership of numerous stations is necessary. While the
need for competition among the major national networks corresponds with the concept of diversity, the need for owning numerous stations does not necessarily correspond with the concept of national networks. ls8
Herein lies the difficulty of analyzing the Seven Station
Rule within strict ownership concepts. Ownership is merely one
factor in determining the viability of national networks. A more
important concept may be affiliation. ls7 Since there are over 200
133. NOTICE, at 48 Fed. Reg. 49442-43, 49446-47.
134. Id., at 49446.
135. Id.
136. Any argument relating to diversity and ownership strongly implies that monopoly ownership equals monopoly viewpoint. In essence, it assumes that each station owner's viewpoint will necessarily be the viewpoint of the station. In making this assumption, the editorial powers of both station management and reporters are presumed
secondary to those of the station owner. This presumption, while debatable, has its roots
in the early history of the multiple ownership rules. The limitations on ownership were
placed, in part, on the reasoning that station ownership equals station viewpoint, however, any analysis regarding editorial control over a station is best undertaken on a caseby-case bias. While it is arguable that both the station owners and their editorial boards
will both have significant impact on station viewpoint, both the FCC and this article
follow the presumption of owners having a stronger imput. A second prong of this issue
is separating editorial and entertainment viewpoint within the same station. Both are
likely to be influenced by separate groups or individuals within the sanIe station (as well
as the owner(s». In some cases, the "viewpoint" may differ with each division within the
station.
These factors tend to cloud any definition of each station's viewpoint. However, as
with most business entities, the final decisions are made by, and are the responsibilities
of the owriers. In light of this ultimate decision-making power, the FCC's focus on ownership as representing the broad viewpoint of a station becomes clearer.
137. A general outline of network features is as follows: Each of the three existing
networks owns, or is affiliated with a group of stations that collectively broadcast to markets containing virtually all viewers in the United States. Network programming that is
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television markets in the United States, the Seven Station Rule
distributed to affiliates is typically shown at the same time by all affiliates operating
within the same time zone. Approximately 85 to 100 hours of programming are made
available by the networks to the affiliates. The networks sell advertising time within
most network programs to national advertisers who want to have their advertising carried by all of the network's affiliates, although some commercial advertising time or network programming is left for sale by affiliates. Each network produces several of its own
programs, and finances the production of virtually all other programs that it carries on a
network basis.
A typical affiliate-network contract works as follows: Much of the programming is
provided by the networks. The networks either produce it themselves, or purchase it
from independent sources. The networks then purchase access time on the affiliate stations. The method used is either a direct.cash payment to the affiliate or air time is made
available during and between programming for direct sale by the affiliate stations to
advertisers. In the alternative, the advertising is provided by the national networks to
their affiliates, with a percentage of the earnings flowing from the networks to the affiliate. Time slots are created during and between programs for advertising which may be
provided by the network, or may be sold by the individual stations. Earnings from the
advertising are divided according to individual contract terms. Also, percentage of the
time that must remain open to national advertising vary from contract to contract. In
addition to advertising earnings, affiliate stations are compensated by the networks for
carrying network programs. This often amounts to a substantial percentage of station
revenue. The advantage of networking to both networks and the affiliates make involvement in this form of enterprise economically desirable. The first advantage is spreading
the cost of program production over a larger number of stations. Once a program is produced for one station, no additional production costs are incurred when the program is
shown on other stations. This does not necessarily guarantee a higher quality program,
but it will generally prevent expensive production costs from derailing a project.
A second advantage is simultaneous transmission of programs within the same time
zone. With simultaneous transmission, the size and composition of a potential audience
that an advertiser can reach will be easier and more accurately predicted than if the
same program was shown at different times.
Additionally, simultaneous transmission may help reduce distribution costs since it
becomes possible to employ electronic interconnection. If the program is now shown simultaneously, three typical alternatives are possible. Separate prints of the program may
be made and distributed. In the alternative, either the affiliate stations must tape the
program for later use, or the network must make multiple feeds to the affiliate at different times. All the alternatives add expense to the dissemination of programming.
Another advantage of simultaneous transmission is facilitation of advance promotion
of the program. The program can air simultaneously on all network affiliates, as well as
appear in magazines, radio, newspapers, etc. on a national basis, thereby reducing production and distribution costs. Also, air time that ordinarily would be used to promote a
program could be saved for sale to advertisers.
The next advantage is seen in all phases of advertising sales. Both the network and
its individual affiliate stations sell advertising time. Having national network advertising
as an option adds an attractive economic lure to the networks for the national advertiser
(and, in turn the economic benefits to the networks of having top-dollar advertisers as
customers). Transaction costs are lower than if an advertiser had to contact each station
individually. Thus, the advertiser saves expenditures prior to purchase of national advertising time. Another benefit to advertisers is the ability to reach the entire country at
once. Certain programs that are likely to draw exceptionally large national audiences will
attract national advertisers hoping to impact upon a larger audience than is typically
watching television at that time. NETWORK INQUIRY, at 228-29, 231-34, 446-52.
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eliminates the possibility of outright ownership of a national
network by an individual or corporate entity. In order for a commercial broadcaster to regularly broadcast its programming on a
national scale, the formation of affiliate contracts with numerous
independent stations is necessary. Although no strict definition
of "national" network is employed, ABC, NBC and CBS all
reach greater than ninety percent of the more than 200 television markets in the V.S.m These three networks have successfully established and maintained a sufficient number of affiliate
stations to be considered national. The ownership limitations
have only marginally obstructed this procedure. With these
three networks operating under the current regulatory framework, it is apparent that the ownership limitations are not an
absolute bar to national networking.
138. As of 1980, ABC had 203 affiliates, CBS had 198, and NBC had 212. 1980
Broadcasting/Cable Yearbook D-24, D-33, D-39. In addition, each network ownS five stations. ABC reaches 98.1% of the nation's households, CBS reaches 96.5%, and NBC
reaches 96.9%. 44 Fed. Reg. 36.63 (1978).
The three existing national networks own or affiliate with approximately 600 of
these stations. That leaves about 270 stations available for affiliation with other group
owners desiring national network status. Affiliates are not exclusively bound to anyone
network. The FCC has established several regulations governing network-affiliate relationships. A sampling of these regulations are as follows: Network affiliations contracts
cannot bind a station to a network for more than two years. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (c) (1979).
These contracts cannot bar affiliates from broadcasting programs of another network. 47
C.F.R. § 73.658 (a) (1979). Conversely, affiliates are not permitted to prevent other stations in the'same geographic area from broadcasting network programs not taken by that
affiliate. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (1979). The affiliate station has a right to reject network
programs offered or contracted for if the the affiliate reasonably believes the program is
unsatisfactory, unsuitable, contrary to the public interest, or if the station chooses to
substitute programming it believes is of greater importance. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (e)
(1979). Networks are not permitted to, contract for any option time on the affiliate stations. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (d) (1979).
Even though the requisite number of stations are available, there is no guarantee
that these stations will cover enough markets for national network status. For example,
both New York City and Los Angeles will have several stations left over after three are
owned or affiliated with ABC, NBC, and CBS. However, many smaller markets either do
not have, or cannot support more than three stations. Therefore, if the three networks
enter a smaller market though affiliation, others are likely to be excluded.
Also, because the three national networks have been successful for several decades,
independent VHF stations almost always find the three national networks a more attractive package, both economically and in available programming. Having a greater number
of stations available with which to spread programming costs increases the national network's ability to produce and distribute programming. This advantage brings economic
benefit to all parties involved. This vicious cycle (a large number of affiliates available to
distribute programming lead to lower cost of production and distribution which equals
greater gain, makes networks more desirable to affiliates) keeps the networks in an unmatched position, and works to keep others out of the national network competition.
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Alternatives to the Seven Station Rule based upon a strict
ownership analysis are not likely to change things. For example,
if the Seven Station Rule is amended to allow ownership of fourteen or twenty-one television stations, massive affiliation will
still be necessary to achieve national status. If ownership limitations are completely abolished, then individuals could conceivable own their own networks. However, ownership of close to 200
stations by several entities would (or at least should) violate antitrust standards under the indexes offered in the Notice. Theoretically, ownership of that many television stations would be
unallowable. No matter how the problem is approached, some
form of affiliation will' still be needed. Logically, it might be
more productive to examine the network-affiliate rules as well as
the ownership rules, if lack of diversity among the national networks is a problem.
IV.

ALTERNATIVES TO TOTAL ELIMINATION OF THE SEVEN STATION RULE

The Commission notes the importance of national and regional networks in providing the best service to the public. Uti
However, they generally ignore the large role national networking plays in determining the diversity of information available to
the viewing public. This impact cannot be properly analyzed
within the narrow confines of the station ownership rules if
other factors such as frequency, network-affiliate relationships
and program supply are not considered. The FCC should analyze potential changes in all of these components when considering amendment of the Seven Station Rule.
The success of the three networks at creating and maintaining their affiliate contacts has vaulted them to a position of
prominence, while almost completely reducing competition on a
national scale. Virtually every VHF licensed station in the
United States is owned or affiliated with one of the three major
networks. 140 All three networks broadcast predominantly on
VHF.HI The turnover rate among affiliate stations is minimal,
139. NOTICE, at 48 Fed. Reg. 49446.
140. See supra, note 127.
141. Id. The networks affiliate with approximately 600 stati~ns combined, and the
1979 FCC Annual Report lists 484 of the 513 VHF stations in the U.S. as owned or

affiliated with the networks.
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and when any turnover occurs, the station invariably leaves one
major network for another.142
FCC policy over the years has played a large role in creating
this current scenario. In the post World War II years, the UHF
frequency, although capable of containing five and one-half
times as many channels per market than VHF, was rejected by
the FCC in favor of VHF. us This was partly because of lobbying
efforts by the leading radio networks that were seeking entrance
into the television markets. The radio equipment of that era was
easily adapted to VHF. 144 If VHF was chosen as the television
frequency, enormous saving could be made on equipment, personnel training, and other expenses. The plan was to eventually
move all television to UHF because of its superior channel-holding capabilities which would open television to a broader number of owners.14lI By 1948, the FCC, unable to keep up with demand for licenses using only VHF, initiated its license freeze.
During this freeze, the early television networks cemented
their affiliation contacts. Since there were few licenses, those
companies with prior networking experience in radio had a natural advantage over newcomers to the industry. There were also
very few newcomers because the freeze began before commercial
television moved beyond the experimental stage. Also, once the
freeze was lifted four years later, the early networks were established bastions of the industry. The most economically lucrative
arrangement for a new licensee was to affiliate with an industry
leader. The economic benefits of networking advanced with each
newly added affiliate, making changes in the arrangement economically disadvantageous. New network competition was virtually impossible. New licensees, faced with the choice of affiliating and sharing economic benefits with an established multimarket network or affiliating with a novice, limited-market network almost always chose the former.
142. NETWORK INQUIRY supra, note 129, at 163-167. The FCC Special Staff reviewed
affiliate turnover during the period 1968-1977. A total of 46 affiliate stations left their
network during these years. All moved to affiliation with another major network.
143. Geller, A Modest Proposal for Modest Reform of the Federal Communications
Commission, 63 GEO. L.J. 70S, 707-708 (1975), citing, Allocations Report of May IS,
1945, FCC No. 6651, at 99-100, 1 P&F Radio Reg. (Part 3) Sec. 91.67.
144. [d.
145. [d.
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A second result of the freeze was the fate of UHF television.
When the freeze was lifted, the FCC decided to allocate part of
UHF to television.146 One drawback to the delay was that in the
interim, millions of television sets had been sold containing only
VHF dials. In order to receive the new UHF stations, the viewing public would have to purchase either new sets or UHF
adapters. The adapters were often of poor quality, which made
clear UHF reception difficult.
The FCC next made the decision that sealed the fate of
UHF. They decided to intermix stations of both frequencies
within the same markets.1(7 There had been demand to separate
the two frequencies in order that new UHF stations would not
have to compete with established VHF stations in the same market. 148 Many commentators and industry leaders felt UHF could
not survive in direct competition with VHF, given the historical
development of FCC policy.H9 These analyses were proved correct when the FCC intermixed the fr~quencies. UHF was
doomed to an inferior status. 160
This major network domination presents two problems to
other networks seeking national status. The first can be termed
a coverage handicap. This occurs if all of the commercial channels assigned to a given market are affiliated with some or all of
the three national networks. There are no assignments available
for affiliation with a potential entrant and that entrant is effectively closed out of a market. un The second problem is a technical handicap. If the only channel available for affiliation with a
new entrant is a UHF station, and the three national networks
are operating on VHF, the new entrant will be forced to compete
using a technologically inferior station. 162 If either problem occurs in enough television markets, the new entrant will not be
able to telecast nationally. Since the VHF stations are virtually
146.
147.
148.
149.

41 F.C.C. 148, 154 (1952).
[d. at 205-209.
[d.

See generally, The Darkened Channels: UHF Television and the FCC, 75
L. REV. 1578 (1962).
150: [d.
151. Schuessler, Structural Barriers to the Entry of Additional Television Net-

HARV.

works: The Federal Communications Commission's Spectrum Management Policies, 54
So. CALIF. L. REV. 875, 879 (1981).
.
152. [d., at 879-880.
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closed off to all but the three networks,1113 these handicaps alone
end the possibility for a fourth national network under present
conditions.
This vicious cycle has existed for the entire history of television in this county. The Notice acknowledges this problem as an
affront to the FCC diversity principles. 1M It concludes that eliminating the media ownership rules would allow new entrants to
gain a proper foothold by permitting ownership of a sufficient
number of stations in which to create a base for quality programming. This, in turn, would make affiliation with these networks desirable. ll1l1In this analysis, the Notice overlooks the
VHF!UHF handicap. The current VHF allocation supports only
three national networks. Unless VHF allocation to television is
expanded,1I58 additional new networks would have to be formed
entirely on UHF, an approach that has failed in the past and is
likely to fail in the future. Those purchasing VHF stations
would have the same advantage as those currently affiliating
with VHF stations. The only change would be that networks
would be owned instead of affiliated combinations. In addition,
outright ownership of VHF networks by three entities completely destroys any notions of diversity currently enjoyed.
This emphasis on ownership, without consideration of other
essential factors, is the basic failing of the Notice. If all the essential factors are considered together, and amending the Seven
Station Rule is reviewed in context with amending other regulatory policy, perhaps the FCC goal of diversity through new national networks could be a reality.
V.

PROPOSAL

Television marketplace history has provided that no national network can compete without a significant number of
153.
154.

NETWORK INQUIRY, at 163-167.
NOTICE, at 48 F.2d Reg. 49442-43,

49446-47.

155. [d.

156. The FCC is allocated forty-eight percent of the VHF band. The remaining
fifty-two percent is divided among other government agencies. Of the VHF allocation,
the FCC has allocated 55.8 percent to television. 47 C.F.R. § 2.106 (1979). Thus, television occupies about twenty-five percent of the total VHF band. It is conceivable for the
FCC to expand the VHF allocation to television. Such action would be at the expense of
other groups occupying the band such as police and fire departments.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol14/iss2/7

26

1984J

King: FCC and Media Regulation

FCC AND MEDIA REGULATION

425

VHF channels. It is also evident that affiliates will never leave
the three major networks for a novice network under the current
regulatory system. III'1 The failure of the FCC to numerically limit
network affiliation with VHF licensed stations has led to an indirectly sanctioned monoplization of the national airwaves by
three networks. By allowing indirect monopolization to persist,
the FCC has allowed the principles behind the· Seven Station
Rule to be eroded. Alterations in the ownership rules merely
perpetuate this monopolization under the guise of creating and
supporting diversity.
As an alternative to the vague amendments of the Seven
Station Rule offered in the Notice,1II8 The FCC should consider
the following alternative proposals. First, the FCC should numerically limit network affiliation with VHF stations. Second,
the FCC should maintain the VHF station ownership limits at
five, and expand the UHF ownership limit to a significant
enough percentage of markets needed for developing and/or
maintaining a national market.
The purpose behind the first proposal can be seen through
the following example: The FCC numerically limits affiliation
with VHF licensed stations to forty-five. IllS Assuming the three
existing national networks own five VHF stations and affiliate
with up to the new numerical limit, they would cover 150 out of
the approximately 530 existing VHF stations. This is in comparison to the approximately 500 VHF stations currently affiliated
with the three networks. This reduction would open approximately 340 VHF stations for affiliation with other group owners
seeking the formation of a national network ..
The second part of the proposal is offered as a buffer to the
consequences of the first proposal. When the networks are re. stricted by the VHF affiliation limits, it will block approximately
three-quarters of the markets necessary to telecast nationally.
This gap must be compensated by UHF stations. Many markets
157. NETWORK INQUIRY, at 163-67.
158. See supra, notes 17 and 18, and accompanying text.
159. This number is used for strictly hypothetical purposes. If a proposal such as
this is adopted, the numerical limits on VHF affiliation chosen by the FCC should allow
any developing new networks to affiliate with a sufficient enough number of VHF stations to create the necessary base for national networking.
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only support a few, if any, independent UHF stations. Thus, the
possibility exists· of networks needing affiliation into specific
markets, and having an insufficient number of independent
UHF stations available. If the UHF ownership limits are expanded, this problem could be alleviated by allowing networks
to file for a UHF license in markets where affiliation is impossible. leo This combination of the two proposals creates a situation
where national networking can only be achieved through a mix
of VHF and UHF stations.
Analysis of potential network competition must be done on
both national and local levels. Nationally, the competitive balance would be fostered by numerical equality of stations on
VHF. The prior monopolization would no longer be permitted
and each network could conceivable have an effective base of
fifty VHF stations. Also, each network would affiliate with
roughly the same number of UHF stations. The technical imbalance among on-air stations currently stifling national competition would be partially alleviated. The inability of networks to
maintain a quality base for programming is given in the Notice
as a prime reason for the failure of new national networks to
develop. leI With numerical limits on this quality base (i.e., sufficient VHF stations), the vicious cycle which has prevented new
national networks from forming will no longer be supported by
regulatory indifference. The success or failure of new national
networks will be determined to a· larger extent in the
marketplace.
Locally, the competitive balance in some markets might be
drastically altered. One consequence of this Comment's proposed regulation is the "divestment" of numerous affiliation contracts by the three national networks. Their choice of which
markets to maintain will undoubtedly vary. The impact on each
individual market will be on whether the existing national networks maintain VHF affiliation or opt for ownership/affiliation
160. Opening up UHF ownership to established networks may help achieve a long
standing FCC goal - bolstering UHF television. It has been difficult for independent
UHF stations to survive in many markets. However, a UHF station in these same markets may have a better chance of survival if it receives the advantages of networking.
Ownership is proposed over affiliation, because the networks can establish new stations
via ownership, whereas affiliation requires existing stations.
161. NOTICE, at 48 Fed. Reg. 49446.
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on UHF. For example, a market has three available VHF channels; if NBC maintains VHF affiliation, and CBS and ABC opt
for UHF, NBC will probably start off with an advantage. Conceivably, two emerging networks would affiliate with the VHF
stations, creating (at least) a five-station market. In the past, the
two UHF stations would probably be weaker. However, if the
two UHF stations have the benefit of affiliating with CBS and
ABC, the prior UHF stigma may not automatically condemn
these stations to second-class status. The public perception of
UHF inferiority might change if familiar and popular network
programming is broadcast on a UHF station. If this pattern occurs, the hypothetical local market would have five fairly competitive channels in the long run.
Another conceivable scenario would have all three networks
maintaining their VHF affiliate ties in a local market. This
would maintain the status quo and keep potential networks at
the same technical disadvantage as experienced at present. However, if the existing networks maintain VHF contacts in one
market, other markets would be blocked from VHF affiliation
under the new proposal. Therefore, new networks would have
technical superiority over all three current national networks in
some markets.
In analyzing these consequences of such a drastic regulatory
shift, the impact on three significant parties - the viewers, the
individual stations, and the networks - must be reviewed. The
most important group listed' above is the viewer, for the essential
premise of the Communications Act is to regulate broadcasting
in the public interest. 182 One tenet of this philosophy is to provide the best possible service to each geographic locality!88 Arguably, the three national networks provide quality service to
each geographic locality under the current system. The three
networks each cover most of the United States. Conceivably,
these networks would occasionally be faced with the option to
enter a small market by purchasing and operating a UHF station. If the network chooses to forego such a market, that market will be deprived of a significant programming option.
162. See supra, note 1.
163. This is regulated through the licensing procedure: "the CommiBBion shall make
such distribution of licenses ... to provide a fair, efficient, and equitable distribution of
radio service to each of [each radio market]." 47 U.S.C. § 307 (b) (1970).
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However, this is unlikely for several reasons. First, if affiliation into these markets is currently economically desirable, ownership of a station may prove equally or substantially more lu-.
crative. Also, entrepreneurs might be lured into purchasing a
UHF station with the hope of affiliating with a national network.
Independent station owners in the smaller markets are currently
affiliating with the three networks, and, except for shifting frequencies, present circumstances would not be altered. The ultimate impact on the viewer is one of inconvenience, rather than
deprivation of service.
The impact on the independent VHF stations will be more
pronounced. Those not selected for continuing affiliation with
their networks face the following choices: (1) remaining independent, (2) affiliating with a new network, (3) selling their station
to a new network, or (4) seizing the opportunity to establish a
separate national network. Alternatively, these stations could
opt to remain with their network, and trade their VHF license
for a UHF license. uu By trading their frequency, a licensee is
gambling that associating with a leading, established network is
a wiser business choice than facing the new options by remaining on VHF. With any of these selections, the licensee will face a
difficult business choice, one that would not exist without further regulatory tampering. The ensuing flux in the industry may
render . some previously successful businesses into economic
losers.
The networks would also be placed in a forced transitory
situation. For each, approximately three-quarters of their broadcast outlets will be shifted from VHF to UHF, with the attendant possibility of lower revenues and diminished status in the
industry. The three major networks will also take the brunt of
any regulatory change, since no other network will be forced to
break off affiliate ties.
The justification for such radical changes lies in the basic
premise of broadcast regulation. Broadcasters are licensees of
the public trust who hold no ownership rights. when granted a
license. The success of the networks is partially due to this li164. If these proposals were adopted, some preference should be granted to VHF
licensees shifting to UHF licenses.
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cense system. 1611 In fact, FCC regulation may perpetuate the
three networks' superior status, contrary to the public interest in
diversity of sources. The FCC determination that the public interest may be served better by numerous national networks supports policy aimed at diminishing the monopoly power of the
three networks. Therefore, regulation reducing this control is
conducive to promotion of the public interest standard.
David C. King*

165. See supra, notes 143-151, and accompanying text.
·Third-year student Golden Gate University School of Law.
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